boundary class
Reducibility among NP-Hard graph problems and boundary classes
Hassan, Syed Mujtaba, Hussain, Shahid, Samad, Abdul
Many NP-hard graph problems become easy for some classes of graphs, such as coloring is easy for bipartite graphs, but NP-hard in general. So we can ask question like when does a hard problem become easy? What is the minimum substructure for which the problem remains hard? We use the notion of boundary classes to study such questions. In this paper, we introduce a method for transforming the boundary class of one NP-hard graph problem into a boundary class for another problem. If $\Pi$ and $\Gamma$ are two NP-hard graph problems where $\Pi$ is reducible to $\Gamma$, we transform a boundary class of $\Pi$ into a boundary class of $\Gamma$. More formally if $\Pi$ is reducible to $\Gamma$, where the reduction is bijective and it maps hereditary classes of graphs to hereditary classes of graphs, then $X$ is a boundary class of $\Pi$ if and only if the image of $X$ under the reduction is a boundary class of $\Gamma$. This gives us a relationship between boundary classes and reducibility among several NP-hard problems. To show the strength of our main result, we apply our theorem to obtain some previously unknown boundary classes for a few graph problems namely; vertex-cover, clique, traveling-salesperson, bounded-degree-spanning-tree, subgraph-isomorphism and clique-cover.
- Asia > Pakistan > Sindh > Karachi Division > Karachi (0.05)
- North America > United States > New York (0.04)
- North America > United States > Massachusetts > Suffolk County > Boston (0.04)
Equilibrium-Invariant Embedding, Metric Space, and Fundamental Set of $2\times2$ Normal-Form Games
Marris, Luke, Gemp, Ian, Piliouras, Georgios
Equilibrium solution concepts of normal-form games, such as Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria, describe the joint strategy profiles from which no player has incentive to unilaterally deviate. They are widely studied in game theory, economics, and multiagent systems. Equilibrium concepts are invariant under certain transforms of the payoffs. We define an equilibrium-inspired distance metric for the space of all normal-form games and uncover a distance-preserving equilibrium-invariant embedding. Furthermore, we propose an additional transform which defines a better-response-invariant distance metric and embedding. To demonstrate these metric spaces we study $2\times2$ games. The equilibrium-invariant embedding of $2\times2$ games has an efficient two variable parameterization (a reduction from eight), where each variable geometrically describes an angle on a unit circle. Interesting properties can be spatially inferred from the embedding, including: equilibrium support, cycles, competition, coordination, distances, best-responses, and symmetries. The best-response-invariant embedding of $2\times2$ games, after considering symmetries, rediscovers a set of 15 games, and their respective equivalence classes. We propose that this set of game classes is fundamental and captures all possible interesting strategic interactions in $2\times2$ games. We introduce a directed graph representation and name for each class. Finally, we leverage the tools developed for $2\times2$ games to develop game theoretic visualizations of large normal-form and extensive-form games that aim to fingerprint the strategic interactions that occur within.
- North America > Canada > Alberta (0.14)
- Europe > United Kingdom > England > Cambridgeshire > Cambridge (0.04)
- North America > United States > Michigan (0.04)
- (5 more...)
- Leisure & Entertainment > Games (1.00)
- Banking & Finance (1.00)